Competition among bureaucrats for bribe revenue has often been viewed as a way to reduce the incidence and magnitude of bribe payments. This paper proposes a model where firms can search among multiple corrupt bureaucrats to find the cheapest bribe associated with obtaining a required service. Competition among bureaucrats can reduce the size of bribes only when all firms can search without cost. When search costs prohibit some firms from shopping around, competition actually increases the bribes that bureaucrats charge. This result is tested empirically using Russia as a case study. Using firm-level surveys and regional panel data I find evidence that more competition within the municipal administrative bureaucracy is associated with larger bribe payments made by firms. I conclude that bureaucratic competition for bribe revenue is not always a solution to the corruption problem.
Introduction
Bribe payments in countries struggling with bureaucratic corruption are becoming so entrenched in the interaction between bureaucrats and firms that they are seen as simply an additional fee of doing business. This paper explores the relationship between corrupt bureaucrats and the private sector, examining bureaucratic market structure to determine what effect bureaucratic competition has on the propensity to solicit bribes and the magnitude of such bribe payments.
Bureaucratic competition arises when multiple agents providing the same service attempt to extract bribes from firms or individuals in the private sector. Since clients will only seek those bureaucrats that request the lowest bribes, economic theory suggests that more competitive bureaucracies should be associated with both a reduction in the incidence and magnitude of bribe payments. I investigate the effect of bureaucratic competition on corruption by adapting a model of search costs and price dispersion first proposed by Dale Stahl (1989) to arrive at a new model of bribe price determination in a competitive bureaucratic environment. In this setting an exogenous number of government agents operating in a licensing department are visited by firms that require a license to either begin or continue operating. Agents demand a bribe to expedite provision of the license and are capable of denying it if the bribe is not paid. Firms may immediately pay off an agent to receive the license or search among other bureaucrats in the same or related departments to possibly negotiate a lower bribe payment.
For some firms search is associated with production or construction delays and bears substantial costs. These firms cannot afford to "shop around" among all agents and must weigh the benefits of a lower bribe price against the costs of continued search. When the distribution of firms consists of both positive and zero-cost searchers an equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies, and a bribe price distribution can be generated with each government agent charging a different price within its bounds. I investigate how the shape of the price distribution changes with relevant model parameters. Most importantly I examine the effect on the equilibrium of increasing bureaucratic competition as represented by the number of competing agents. In the presence of positive firm search costs, increasing competition reduces agents' profits but still incentivizes them to demand larger bribes. The intuition is that while low prices attract firms with low search costs, competition makes capturing this segment of the market relatively more difficult. Agents partially offset lost profits by charging higher average prices knowing that positive search cost firms will have no choice but to pay.
The model is then extended by introducing honest firms that refuse to pay bribes. If they are solicited for a payment they will turn in the rent-seeking bureaucrat, who will then be faced with a penalty. The addition of penalties to corruption introduces the possibility of an equilibrium where no bribes are solicited. Increasing bureaucratic competition in this setting will lower agents' profits and increase the solution space of a no-bribe equilibrium.
Consequently competition can reduce the incidence of bribe-taking but still increase the size of individual payments. I test the relationship between bureaucratic competition and bribe payments using firmlevel surveys and regional panel data from Russia. Utilizing region-level density of government employment as a proxy for bureaucratic competition, I find that firms operating in more competitive regions are less likely to pay bribes to government officials. However when firms do pay, the payments that they make are significantly larger. Additional analyses demonstrate that competition specifically within the municipal executive government is the key driver of both of these results. This branch of government houses the administrative bureaucracy that is often associated with petty corruption. As such the empirical results support the predictions of the theoretical model, indicating that more bureaucratic competition within the administrative arm of government is associated with larger but less frequent bribe payments.
This research therefore proposes a new model of the interaction between bureaucrats and firms and finds support for its predictions using Russian data. The paper proceeds as follows:
Section 2 discusses related literature in the field of corruption research with a focus on bureaucratic competition. Section 3 presents the original theoretical model and corresponding results while section 4 advances the model by introducing penalties to corruption and honest firms that refuse to pay bribes. Section 5 presents the empirical results on corruption and bureaucracy in Russia, and section 6 concludes.
Key Related Literature
The relationship between corruption and competition need not be limited to the structure of bureaucracy. The competitiveness of the private sector is also important in determining the prevalence of corruption. Industries that are not dominated by a single or small group of firms may be less likely to generate enough excess profits to support a system of bribe-taking. Bliss and Di Tella (1997) present a model of firm competition where the existence of corrupt bureaucrats can drive firms out of the market. Bureaucrats can then demand larger bribes from the remaining firms; however the overall effect of competition on corruption is uncertain since markets with fewer firms are not necessarily less competitive, and "deep competition" parameters of their model provide ambiguous results. Ades and Di Tella (1999) investigate the effect of private sector competition on corruption using country-level market dominance and corruption indicators. Their results do indicate that countries with less competitive economies and ineffective antitrust regulations have higher levels of corruption.
In examining the structure of bureauracy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) observe that a weak central government that allows agencies to independently impose regulations on the private sector can induce rent-seeking behavior by bureaucrats and ultimately lead to high levels of corruption. They model this as a scenario where multiple agencies provide complementary goods, forcing firms to interact with more than one department in order to obtain a service.
If each agency acts independently to set the price of a good then competition between them will lead to large bribe payments made by firms and fewer goods provided. Conversely when agencies collude and act as a joint monopolist they will actually demand smaller bribes but induce more firms to pay. In this way competition leads to a worse outcome than collusion both because the good is underprovided and the firms that do end up buying are paying more.
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny describe a situation where agencies provide complementary goods, Rose-Ackerman (2003) argues that increasing competition between bureaucrats in the provision of substitute goods can reduce bribe payments and increase the bargaining power of firms. In particular if multiple agencies offer the same service then firms may find it easier to reapply for a license or permit and shop around for lower bribe requests or potentially even find an honest agent. This is often referred to as the principle of overlapping jurisdictions.
However its corruption-reducing effects may only be realized if the cost of reapplication is low enough.
Bribe negotiations between agents and firms are also influenced by the type of services an agent provides. Increasing competition among agents by definition may not be possible if they offer a service that is unique or restricted in supply, such as the awarding of highvalue government contracts. Agent bargaining power may also increase in situations where they have direct knowledge of firm profitability, as is the case with bribes related to tax collection (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Under these circumstances agents have greater ability to price discriminate since the potential benefits to companies are often a function of current or expected profits.
The model in this paper combines the insights of the pioneering theoretical literature presented above. Like Ackerman I assume that agents compete for bribe revenue in the provision of a substitute good. However like Shliefer and Vishny I investigate the potentially deleterious effect of competition on bribe payments, albeit through a different channel.
Sequential Search Model
I adopt the Stahl model of oligopolistic competition to examine corruption among government agents competing for bribe revenue. This is a two-stage model with N ≥ 2 agents providing required licenses to a unit mass of firms.
1 As is frequently the case, new firms require the license to operate while existing firms must renew theirs at regular intervals. I assume all agents are corrupt and derive revenue from bribes paid by firms to expedite the licensing process. In the first stage agents determine the bribe price to solicit. We will see that the equilibrium exhibits bribe price dispersion with agents choosing some price from a common nash equilibrium (NE) price distribution, F (p). In the second stage a firm will search sequentially among agents to find the lowest available price. 
Bribe Price Dispersion and Optimal Firm Search
I follow Stahl in examining equilibrium search behavior of firms requiring licenses. Positive search cost firms will continue to search for a lower bribe price if the benefit of searching outweighs the cost, c. This strategy is formalized in the next section to derive the conditions under which an equilibrium reservation price, ρ, can be found for these firms. This is the price at which they will be indifferent between continuing to search and accepting the current offer.
The following lemmas indicate that (1) : there exists no pure-strategy NE bribe price in a model with both costly and costless searchers (when µ > 0); and (2) 
Agents' Equilibrium Bribe Prices
I now derive agent profits and the NE bribe price distribution. Agents have the following revenue function:
However as firms require exactly one license we have that D(p) = 1. Expected profit to agent j is:
Expected profit comes from the respective proportions of costless and costly searchers that agent j solicits a bribe from. With probability (1 − F (p j )) N −1 this agent requests the smallest bribe of any of the N agents and is paid off by the proportion µ costless searchers.
The remaining 1 − µ costly searchers arrive randomly to all agents and agent j captures a share 1 N of them (since they do not search beyond the first agent).
For F (p) to be a NE bribe price distribution agents must be indifferent between charging any price within its support. Therefore:
Where again u is the upper bound of the support of F (p). E (π (u)) reduces to the above equation as agent j's probability of requesting the lowest bribe is zero at the upper bound.
Solving the above for F (p) yields:
To complete the characterization of the NE bribe price distribution we must solve for the bounds of its support. At the lower bound, b, we have that F (b) = 0. Solving the above price distribution for R(p) at F (p) = 0 we get:
Arriving at an expression for the upper bound requires us to return to optimal firm search. A firm having observed a bribe price p from the first agent will continue to search if the expected benefit from search exceeds the search cost, c. The reservation price, ρ, is then the price that makes a firm indifferent between accepting the bribe and continuing to search. The equation satisfying this condition is as follows:
It is important to reiterate that an agent will never charge above the reservation price of the positive search cost firms; if they do then the firm will continue to search and the agent will lose a bribe opportunity. Hence the upper bound of a NE bribe price distribution must equal to ρ. Note that if a root of H(ρ) exists it will be unique so long as H(ρ) is strictly increasing for all positive bribe prices (as it can only intersect y = c at a single point).
Lemma 3.
∂H(ρ) ∂ρ
Proof. See Lemma 3 of Stahl.
Comparative Statics
Having defined a unique NE bribe price distribution and its support, the goal now is to determine the effects of the relevant parameters (N, µ, c) on the distribution, lower bound, reservation price, and agent profits. Though we do not have a closed form solution for H(ρ), when a root exists we can use the implicit function theorem to examine the local behavior of the parameters. To do this we must first determine the signs of the partial derivatives of H (ρ) with respect to the parameters and the reservation price. First we have that
> 0. This is evident from Leibnitz's rule, where
∂µ dp. Since the integral of the price distribution is over non-negative bounds (and u > b), we can put aside the integral operator and focus exclusively on the derivative of F (p) with respect to µ, which is clearly positive. Finally from Lemma 3 we have that
< 0, and
As each additional search becomes costlier both the lower bound of the bribe price distribution and firm reservation prices increase. F (p) shifts downs, indicating that the probability mass of the entire distribution shifts toward higher bribes, and agents obtain higher profits. Agents rely on the fact that many firms are unable to shop around for potentially lower bribe prices. Consequently as firms' opportunity costs of continued search go up they become more willing to accept a higher bribe.
Proposition 2.
∂ρ ∂µ
> 0, and
As the distribution of firms shifts towards more costless searchers we have that both the bounds of F (p) and the probability mass of the entire distribution shift down to lower bribe prices. Clearly agent profits fall. The lower bound drops as agents attempt to attract the now larger proportion of firms that can shop around for a low bribe price, and as there are fewer firms from whom agents can demand a large bribe the reservation price of costly searchers falls as well.
The last step is to examine the effects on the equilibrium of changing the number of agents competing for bribe revenue. We need the sign of
. Again we can focus on F (p):
With a bit of work it can be shown that
N . This condition is satisfied in the limit as N → ∞. Refer to Stahl for a more formal proof of this condition, as well as a proof of
∂H(ρ) ∂N
< 0 for the model with a constant demand function.
We now see the comparative static effects of increasing the number of agents competing for bribe revenue. The reservation price of firms rises while the lower bound price that an agent offers actually falls. This is because there is increased competition for the costless searchers, who can now search among more agents and pay the lowest solicited bribe. The most significant result is that increased competition for bribe revenue actually leads to higher average prices. This is established by the mass of the bribe price distribution increasing in N . Note that Stahl's explanation for this phenomenon fits with this model as well: as N increases, the probability that any one agent charges the lowest bribe will fall. Consequently there is less incentive to price low to attract costless searchers (though the lower bound does still fall). Agents realize that by demanding larger bribes more frequently they can secure increased revenue from the costly searchers over whom they essentially have a monopoly.
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Despite higher average prices, individual agent profits are still falling since the price increase alone is not enough to compensate for the reduced inflow of costly searchers to any one agent. Profits fall to zero only in the limit however, indicating that when there are no penalties to corruption the model can sustain high bribe prices despite having a very competitive bureaucracy.
I again refer the reader to Stahl for proofs of the above comparative static results (Propo- 
Honest Firms and Penalties to Corruption
I now extend the bribe price model with sequential search by introducing a cost of soliciting bribes. This cost is built into the model by adding a group of honest firms that refuse to pay off bureaucrats. Soliciting this group of firms is risky as they can report on corrupt agents to the authorities. This extension is formalized by introducing a proportion α∈ [0, 1] of firms who are willing to pay bribes to ensure certification. Of these, there is again a fraction µ∈[0, 1] with zero search costs and 1 − µ with positive search costs. The remaining proportion 1 − α of firms are unwilling to pay bribes. They are aware that agents will not grant them certification if they do nothing; consequently their recourse is a legal one. These 2 Janssen, Moraga-González, and Wildenbeest (2005) propose a modification of Stahl's original model where the initial search is costly, leading to an equilibrium with partial consumer participation. Under this assumption expected prices are constant in N. However this assumption is less relevant for this analysis as non-participation by firms requiring a license leads to an infinite cost (firms cannot operate) and is therefore not a rational response. Once they visit an agent, the cost they incur from any subsequent search is the time value of delayed operation or bureaucratic dealings and is reflected in their tradeoff between paying a bribe immediately to receive the license or holding out for a better price.
firms will report on corrupt agents upon being solicited for a bribe payment. Reporting will result in a penalty to the agent, χ (p j ), which is an increasing function of the bribe amount the agent charges. Note that the entire firm distribution still participates and searches among bureaucrats, as the alternative would be (illegally) operating without a license. Bureaucrats know the proportion of honest and dishonest firms in the market, but are again unaware of an individual firm's type. This makes corruption a risky proposition.
We again solve for the equilibrium bribe price distribution. Firm profits are now:
Once again α represents the proportion of firms that pay bribes. As before, with prob-
N −1 this agent solicits the lowest bribe and captures the proportion µ costless searchers as well as his share of the 1 − µ costly searchers. Soliciting a bribe from the proportion 1 − α honest firms results in a penalty. The penalty function is exponential, reflecting the idea that small bribes result in a small fine whereas larger ones result in more severe penalties.
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As before a NE bribe price distribution necessitates that the profit to an agent be equal when charging any price within its support:
Solving for F (p) gives us our new-look price distribution:
Solving the price distribution for R(p) at F (p) = 0 we get:
Since the way in which firms search among bureaucrats has not been altered, the condition for obtaining a unique reservation price has also remained unchanged:
Simulations
We now have the necessary pieces to estimate a NE bribe price distribution for a model with honest firms and penalties to corruption. The goal again is to determine the effects of the relevant parameters (N, µ, α, c) on the equilibrium price distribution, lower bound, and reservation price. As before there is no closed-form solution for the reservation price. The non-linearities introduced by the model extensions also prevent me from signing the derivative of H(ρ) with respect to the relevant parameters, making a comparative statics analysis infeasible. Fortunately the model can be estimated for a range of parameters and a NE bribe price distribution can be computed. By varying a single parameter while holding the others fixed I can determine the effect of each parameter on the equilibrium. I present plots of the NE distributions in Figures 1-4 .
I start by varying the search cost of the c > 0 firms while holding all other parameters constant. Figure 1 plots the equilibrium bribe price distributions for different values of c. As in the original model, with costlier search the lower and upper bound of the bribe price distribution increase. The median and average prices charged by an agent rise, as do agents' profits.
4 The explanation for these directional effects remains the same as before. However we can now see that for c = 0.1 agent profits are negative. A negative profit outcome is clearly not an equilibrium as agents can simply not charge bribes and have a payoff of 0. Consequently with these parameter values we have a no-bribe equilibrium. An agent's ability to extract bribes is simply not great enough to compensate for the penalty faced by soliciting the proportion 1 − α of firms who are whistle blowers. Next I examine the effect on the equilibrium of changing the proportion of costless searchers. Figure 2 presents these results. As with the original model, increasing the proportion of costless searchers shifts the bounds of the bribe price distribution down; both mean and median prices fall, as do agents' profits. Again we see a no-bribe equilibrium for µ = 0.3 and 0.4.
Increasing the proportion α of unscrupulous bribe payers has the same directional effect as increasing firms' search costs. It is intuitive that as more firms are willing to pay bribes to receive licenses the benefit to agents will go up. With the model parametrization presented in Figure 3 , agents require a large proportion of willing bribe payers to receive positive profits. Even at α = 0.75 agents would prefer not to solicit bribe payments. Note that this is the result only for a two-agent bureaucracy. As N rises agents become more willing to solicit bribes even with a low proportion of potential bribe payers. This is because when there are more competing agents a smaller proportion of whistle blowers will visit each agent, reducing the expected penalty that they face.
The equilibrium effects of increasing N are now explored. Figure 4 is a good visual guide to the interesting results that accompanied the original model and remain intact here. The NE bribe price distribution moves towards higher average prices as we increase competition for bribe revenue. Here we clearly see the reservation price increasing in N and the lower bound price falling. The entire price distribution begins to arch downward indicating as before that agents forgo pricing low on account of the increased competition for costless searchers. While each agent charges a single price, the changing shape of the distribution indicates that the probability of any agent pricing low (high) is falling (rising) in N . The effect on profits is in line with the comparative static result that having more agents compete for bribe revenue will lead to lower individual payoffs. Though I do not show it here, with penalties to corruption an agent's expected profits can in fact fall below zero if N gets too large. This occurs when expected penalties outweigh expected bribe revenue. Consequently the solution space of a no-bribe equilibrium is increasing in bureaucratic competition.
Since government agents know only the proportion of firm types in the market they must simply stop soliciting bribes if their expected profits are negative. But in reality we know agents often have knowledge of the individual firms that visit them. This allows them to price discriminate based on need for the license, firm profitability, etc. If agents have knowledge of search costs then increased competition for bribe revenue may make them less willing to solicit bribes from low search cost firms, particularly when penalties to corruption are a possibility. In this way increasing the solution space of a no-bribe equilibrium corresponds to a real-life situation where competition leads to fewer bribe payments by certain types of firms, and consequently reduces the probability with which an average firm pays a bribe as well.
Empirical Analysis of Bureaucratic Competition and Bribe Payments
Inasmuch as I have confidence in the theoretical model I would like to obtain some empirical evidence in support of it's main conclusion: that an increase in bureaucratic competition can result in larger but less frequent bribe payments. I use Russia to test this hypothesis as it exhibits large variation in size of bureaucracy and bribe payments both across regions and through time. A regression analysis is performed to determine whether differences in bureaucratic competition across Russian regions can affect the incidence and magnitude of corruption. The empirical results support the theory, indicating that firms pay larger bribes in more competitive regions but do so less frequently.
Data
An ideal test of the theoretical model would require data at the municipal level for both bribe payments and size of the bureaucracy. Unfortunately such disaggregated data is unavailable. 
Methodology
The empirical analysis first examines the BEEPS data in an OLS framework to determine whether bribes paid by Russian firms are increasing in bureaucratic competition. As the survey data has its drawbacks, 6 a supplementary analysis is performed using the Rosstat In utilizing average fines as a proxy for bribe payments I assume that there is a stable relationship between the fine amount imposed on corrupt government officials and the amount of the bribe they solicited. Though Russia had not passed official anti-corruption legislation until very recently, it is well known that the majority of offenses involving bribe-taking are handled in civil court by imposing a fine on bribe-takers and bribe-payers that is some multiple of the amount transacted, making this a plausible assumption. For the 19 regions in 2009 for which I have data on both bribes and fines the pairwise correlation between the two measures is 0.25. This is quite high considering fines are imposed not only for bribe transactions involving firms, but all private agents in the economy.
I include gross regional product (GRP) per capita and the total employed population in a region-year as additional control variables in the models. The analysis of the BEEPS survey data also controls for the industry in which a firm operates, total firm sales, and the number of interactions a firm had with the public sector. 7 Furthermore, when analyzing the panel dataset I use regional CPI data reporting a change in the price index from the previous year to create a new regional CPI index using 2000 as the base year. I then adjust GRP per capita and average fine payments for inflation to obtain the real amounts in constant 2000 Russian rubles. Adjusting average fines for inflation should lend further support to this measure as being an adequate proxy for bribe payments. There is no reason to suspect that inflation-adjusted fines for non-bribe economic crimes would exhibit much volatility across years or regions; however inflation-adjusted bribe payments have grown dramatically over the examined period. This makes it very likely that I am specifically picking up differences in bribes across time and space. Finally I present all models in logs to mitigate the effect of outliers and ensure normality of residuals.
Analysis of BEEPS Data
I first analyze the BEEPS firm-level data and restrict the sample of firms to those that reported positive bribe payments. I fit a model of the following form: 
Panel Analysis of Average Fines
The analysis described below utilizes Russian regional data across all regions and is therefore free of some of the problems inherent in the BEEPS survey. I utilize the panel dataset of corruption and government employment taken from Rosstat to estimate a two-way fixed effects regression model of the relationship between average fines for economic crimes and bureaucratic competition in a region-year. The model is of the following form:
The measures are as follows: (a) Respondent Cooperation was: excellent (1), fair (2), average (3), bad (4). (b) It is my perception that the responses to the questions regarding opinions and perceptions were: truthful (1), somewhat truthful (2), not truthful (3).
9 This excludability assumption is tested by including both variables as regressors in the second stage. I find that neither one is significant in predicting bribe payment amounts. 10 Brown, Earle, and Gehlbach (2009) analyze the 2005 Russian BEEPS survey to evaluate the effect of regional bureaucracy on Russian post-privatization environment, and somewhat contrary to this research find that a larger bureaucracy is associated with lower bribe payments for government contracts. 
F ine i,t = β Competition
F ine i,t is the average fine for an economic crime in a region-year while competition i,t is again the measure of bureaucratic competition. x i,t is a vector of controls including GRP per capita and total employed population. ν i and ω t are the region and year effects, respectively.
The results are presented in Table 2 .
The regression results indicate that regions with more competitive bureaucracies have statistically significantly higher average fines for economic crimes. As economic crimes include both bribe-related and non-bribe-related offenses, these results imply that bureaucratic competition is associated with increase in fines for the former, the latter, or for both. However there is little reason to suspect that competition will increase average fines for non-briberelated offenses such as fraud or embezzlement, as there is no theoretical or even logical basis for such a connection. It is much more plausible that this relationship is being driven by the bribe-taking activities of the bureaucracy, in which case the results indicate that the average fine for bribery is increasing in competition. Again, based on what we know about the penalties to bribe-taking in Russia this can only be possible if individual bribe payments are also increasing.
Bribe Payments and Government Structure
I have provided evidence that bureaucratic competition in Russia exacerbates corruption by increasing the bribes that the private sector must pay. Note that the measure of bureaucratic competition I have thus far been using has encompassed all government officials within a region. According to the theoretical model we would expect competition specifically within the administrative bureaucracy to have the greatest impact on bribe payments, as each agent in these departments provides a homogeneous good and has frequent interactions with the private sector. In this section I examine whether this is in fact the case by investigating both the horizontal and vertical structure of bureaucracy and their effects on bribes.
I utilize Rosstat regional data for [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , which offers a break-down of total bureaucracy into several components. For each region-year I know the size of both federal and municipal government. While each region has local government employees, there are also local branches of federal government agencies. Rosstat also offers data on the horizontal distribution of bureaucrats within each level of government; that is, how many belong to the executive, legislative and judicial branches. The administrative agencies all operate within the executive branch for both municipal and federal governments. Though no a priori assumptions are made about how the legislature or judiciary affect bribe-taking, the theory would predict that increased competition in the executive branch should increase the size of payments.
Separating the effects of the different segments of government should give us a clearer picture of where bribe-taking is most prevalent. To that end I first estimate the effect of municipal vs. federal bureaucratic competition on bribe payments using both the survey data and the panel data of average fines. The measure of competition is again region-level bureaucratic density, now calculated separately for federal and municipal employees. I use both federal and municipal competition as covariates and estimate the same empirical models as before replacing only the key explanatory variable. The results of the analysis using the BEEPS data are presented in Table 3a , while the results of the panel data are presented in Table 3b .
Both sets of regressions indicate that it is the municipal government that is driving the relationship between bribes and bureaucratic competition. Firms operating in regions with more competitive municipal bureaucracies pay larger bribes, and these regions are also associated with larger fines for economic crimes. Alternatively, competition among federal bureaucrats is not significantly associated with bribe payments.This may suggest that federal officials are not providing the same services as local officials and the services they do provide may be unique and not substitutable. This would reduce the role of bureaucratic competition as firms cannot simply search for another agent providing the same service.
I can now examine whether competition within the administrative bureaucracy, as captured by the executive branch of government, is indeed the main culprit in increasing the size of bribe payments. I break down municipal bureaucratic competition into the executive, legislative and judicial components, and include them in the models as separate explanatory variables. I again analyze both the BEEPS and panel datasets and present the results in Tables 4a and 4b , respectively.
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The results of both analyses are consistent with our expectations, indicating that competition within the executive branch of municipal government is associated with larger bribe payments and larger fines for economic crimes. It is in fact the only branch of municipal government that significantly affects corruption rents. Taken together, tables 3 and 4 point strongly to competition within the municipal administrative bureaucracy as being most salient in determining size of bribe payments. Aside from reinforcing the predictions of the theoretical model, these results are also quite intuitive. Local administrative bureaucracy is composed of the many regulatory and other agencies that have frequent interactions with the private sector. Soliciting bribes is often a matter of opportunity; when the opportunity exists, bureaucratic competition results in even larger payments.
Incidence of Bribe Payments
Thus far the empirical analysis has focused on the size of bribe payments. In this section I examine whether the probability of paying a bribe is also affected by bureaucratic competition. Recall from the theoretical model that competition forces bureaucrats to demand larger bribes but still pushes down their total revenue. When bureaucrats also face the risk of fines for soliciting bribe payments, an increase in competition expands the solution space of a no-bribe equilibrium because expected penalties can outweigh expected revenue. In other words the model predicts that the probability of having to pay a bribe is falling in bureaucratic competition.
I test this implication of the theory using the 2009 BEEPS data and fit the following two probit models:
P aid_Bribe j takes a value of 1 if firm j paid a bribe and 0 if it reported no bribe payments.
12 x j is again a vector of firm-level and region-level control variables. The first model examines the effect of federal vs. municipal bureaucratic competition; the second model examines the relative effect of competition within the three branches of government.
I present the results of these regressions in tables 5and 6.
As indicated by Table 5 competition within the municipal government has a significant effect on the incidence of bribe payments. However, whereas municipal competition increased the size of individual payments here we see that it actually reduces the incidence of payments made by firms operating in these regions. Once again federal bureaucratic competition has no effect on corruption. Table 6 presents the results separating municipal bureaucracy into three branches.
13 As we might expect, only competition within the executive branch reduces the incidence of payments. This result in particular supports the predictions of the theoretical model.
Discussion
The empirics tell us that the average firm will pay larger bribes less frequently in regions where bureaucratic competition is highest. However from the theoretical model we know that not all firms are affected in the same way. Clearly positive search cost firms are disproportionately harmed by bureaucratic competition, whereas zero search cost firms may even benefit if enough bureaucrats compete so that a single one decides to price low. Abstracting from the theory, it is likely that bureaucrats charge different prices based on their knowledge of individual firm search costs. In regions with high bureaucratic competition the low search cost firms may have enough bargaining power to avoid paying bribes altogether. This is especially true if there is sufficient monitoring of corrupt activities. When bureaucrats fear punishment the potential payoff from low search cost firms would simply not justify the risk 12 Sample selection is again a concern, however the identification strategy for a selection model applied previously cannot be replicated here. Though the bribe amount reported is unaffected by honesty and cooperation, the probability of claiming to have paid no bribe is in fact affected. Uncooperative and dishonest firms are more likely to report no bribe payments and so I cannot exclude these variables from the second stage. However, given that the Heckman selection results presented thus far have been qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the original specifications I am confident that the empirical results presented here will not be significantly affected by potential selection bias.
13 None of the branches of federal government were significant in predicting incidence of bribe payments.
of soliciting a bribe. To compensate for these losses bureaucrats would then charge more to high search cost firms with presumably lower bargaining power. The end result, as both the theory and empirics suggest, is that bureaucratic competition increases the bribe payments that some firms make while letting others off the hook entirely.
Conclusion
This research examines the impact of bureaucratic competition on bribe payments made by firms. I propose a model where firms can search among multiple corrupt bureaucrats to find the "cheapest" bribe request in exchange for a required license. I show that in the presence of search costs, an increase in the number of agents competing for bribe revenue leads to an anti-competitive outcome where the bribe an agent charges goes up. Though agents cannot distinguish between positive and zero search cost firms and therefore cannot directly price discriminate, they do know the proportion of each in the market. Competition forces agents to charge higher prices on average because they can no longer rely on capturing the zero search cost "shoppers". Consequently, they price high to focus their efforts on the positive search cost firms that will have no choice but to pay.
When the model is extended by introducing penalties to corruption, agents may altogether refrain from charging bribes and provide licenses for free. This "no-bribe" equilibrium is more likely to occur when we increase bureaucratic competition; this suggests that when bribe-taking becomes risky, bureaucrats will become more selective in soliciting bribes but still price high when the opportunity presents itself.
The model is supported by an empirical investigation that uses firm-level and region-level data from Russia. The results indicate that Russian firms pay significantly larger bribes in regions where bureaucratic competition is strongest, but that they make these payments less frequently. In addition these regions are also associated with higher average fines paid for economic crimes. Further analysis points to the municipal executive bureaucracy as the key branch of government driving the relationship between bureaucratic competition and corruption. These results support the notion that petty corruption is driven primarily by the interaction between the private sector and administrative agencies of local government, where interactions are common and opportunities for graft are vast.
It is a strong possibility that the theoretical model presented in this research uncovers the real mechanism through which bureaucratic competition affects both the incidence and magnitude of bribe payments in Russia. If bribe revenue is threatened by increased competition then corrupt bureaucrats may be forced to demand larger bribes when the opportunity to solicit a payment presents itself. This is especially true if they feel confident that firms will have no choice but to pay, as a firm's opportunity cost of trying to find an honest or less greedy bureaucrat may simply be too high. The dependent variable is the log of the total bribe amount paid by firm j in all interactions with the public sector.
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